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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we must determine whether a former 
employee waived his right to assert claims under the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (“FMLA”), 
and Pennsylvania common law when he signed a Compromise 
and Release Agreement (“C&R”) to settle his workers’ 
compensation claims.  The District Court held that the former 
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employee had waived his claim, and granted Boscov’s Motion 
to Dismiss.  We disagree and will reverse and remand the case. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 This controversy arises from the following facts 
alleged: Craig Zuber (“Zuber”) worked as an employee of 
Boscov’s Inc. (“Boscov’s”) at Fairgrounds Farmers’ Market in 
Reading, Pennsylvania.  On or about August 12, 2014, Zuber 
suffered an injury at work.  He immediately filed a workers’ 
compensation claim, and received work leave.  Zuber returned 
to work on August 14, and on August 17, he requested an 
additional week of medical leave.  The Human Resource 
Manager granted the request, and Zuber returned to work on 
August 26.  On September 10, Boscov’s fired Zuber, and, on 
April 8, 2015, Boscov’s and Zuber signed a C&R before the 
Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry Workers’ 
Compensation Office.   
 On July 9, 2015, Zuber sued Boscov’s under the FMLA 
and Pennsylvania common law.  He alleged that: (1) Boscov’s 
interfered with his FMLA rights by failing to notify him of 
those rights and by not designating his leave as FMLA 
protected; (2) Boscov’s retaliated against him for exercising 
his FMLA rights; and (3) Boscov’s retaliated against him for 
filing a workers’ compensation claim in violation of 
Pennsylvania common law.  Boscov’s moved to dismiss 
Zuber’s complaint, arguing that he waived his FMLA and 
common law rights because the C&R is a general release of 
any claim.  The District Court dismissed Zuber’s complaint 
because of paragraph nineteen of the C&R.  Its reading of that 
paragraph relied upon its interpretation of Hoggard v. Catch, 
Inc., Civ. No. 12-4783, 2013 WL 3430885 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 
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2013), an unpublished district court decision.  Paragraph 
nineteen provides as follows: 
Employer and Employee intend for the herein 
Compromise and Release Agreement to be a full 
and final resolution of all aspects of the 
8/12/2014 alleged work injury claim and its 
sequela whether known or unknown at this time.  
In exchange for Employer paying Employee the 
one-time lump sum payment as noted in 
paragraph number 10 of the herein Compromise 
and Release Agreement, Employee is forever 
relinquishing any and all rights to seek any and 
all past, present and/or future benefits, including, 
but not limited to, wage loss benefits, specific 
loss benefits, disfiguement [sic] benefits, 
medical benefits or any other monies of any kind 
including, but not limited to, interest, costs, 
attorney’s fees and/or penalties for or in 
connection with the alleged 8/12/2015 [sic] work 
injury claim as well as any other work injury 
claim(s) Employee may have with or against 
Employer up through and including 4/7/2015.  
Employee understands that if this Compromise 
and Release Agreement is approved by the 
Workers’ Compensation Judge, the 8/12/2014 
claim is closed forever and can never be 
reopened in the future even if the alleged work 
injuries would worsen.  Employee and Employer 
waive all rights under the Pennsylvania 
Workers’ Compensation Act to appeal the Final 
Decision and/or Order of the WCJ approving this 
Agreement. 
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App. 31.  The District Court rejected Zuber’s Motion for 
Reconsideration, and Zuber filed a timely Notice of Appeal.   
II. JURISDICTION 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Zuber’s federal FMLA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  It 
had supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We employ a plenary standard when reviewing a district 
court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Fowler v. 
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  We take 
all of Zuber’s factual allegations and their reasonable 
inferences as true.  Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 
239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, 
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 In order to determine whether Zuber waived his FMLA 
and common law claims, we must first address what law 
controls before discussing the C&R and its scope more 
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specifically.  After doing so, we find that Zuber did not waive 
his FMLA and common law claims. 
A. Pennsylvania Law 
 The District Court dismissed Zuber’s claims due to its 
interpretation of the C&R’s scope.  This is a matter of contract 
law, not constitutional or statutory interpretation.  See Mazzella 
v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. 1999) (“The enforceability 
of settlement agreements is governed by principles of contract 
law.”).  “[T]he interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a matter 
of state law . . . .”  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 
468 (2015).  As the parties agree, Pennsylvania contract 
law applies.  
  “A long line of Pennsylvania cases has held that a 
release covers only those matters which may be fairly said to 
have been within the contemplation of the parties when the 
release was given.”  Restifo v. McDonald, 230 A.2d 199, 201 
(Pa. 1967).  “When the terms of a contract are clear and 
unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from 
the document itself.”  Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (Pa. 
2004). “When, however, an ambiguity exists, parol evidence is 
admissible to explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity, 
irrespective of whether the ambiguity is patent, created by the 
language of the instrument, or latent, created by extrinsic or 
collateral circumstances.”  Id. 
 Accordingly, we review the C&R, and, if ambiguous, 
proceed to examine its background.  In light of the C&R’s 
ordinary meaning and structure, we find that Zuber’s FMLA 
and common law claims cannot “be fairly said to have been 
within the contemplation of the parties when the release was 
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given.”  Restifo, 230 A.2d at 201.  Because the document is 
unambiguous, we need not review any parol evidence.   
B. The Ordinary Meaning of the C&R 
 The ordinary meaning of the C&R’s language suggests 
that the parties did not intend the C&R to cover the FMLA or 
common law claims.  This conclusion rests on our 
interpretation of two sentences in the C&R’s nineteenth 
paragraph.  We address each in turn. 
 First, we discuss the first sentence of the nineteenth 
paragraph.  That sentence provides as follows: “Employer and 
Employee intend for the herein Compromise and Release 
Agreement to be a full and final resolution of all aspects of the 
8/12/2014 alleged work injury claim and its sequela whether 
known or unknown at this time.”  App. 31, ¶ 19.   
 “[I]ts” refers to “work injury claim.”  Sequela, a 
singular noun, means a “suit.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (10th 
ed. 2014).1  As a result, the sentence only prohibits Zuber from 
                                              
1 Sequela also has a medical definition, meaning “the 
aftereffect of disease or injury.”  Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary 1065 (10th ed. 2002); see also 
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1752 (28th ed. 2006) (defining 
sequela as “[a] condition following as a consequence of a 
disease”).  Using this definition of sequela, the C&R prevents 
Zuber from collecting any additional compensation associated 
with future medical complications from his injury but it would 
not preclude recovery from the FMLA and common law claims 
at issue in this case. 
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bringing an additional “work injury claim” suit.  Here, Zuber 
seeks to bring a suit against Boscov’s for failing to notify him 
of his FMLA rights, for not designating his leave as FMLA 
protected, and for firing him for exercising his FMLA rights 
and workers’ compensation claim.  Zuber is not bringing an 
additional “work injury claim,” such as a workers’ 
compensation claim or a tort.  Therefore, the C&R does not 
prohibit his claims. 
 Boscov’s implies that sequela is a noun that means suit 
or claim.  Appellee’s Br. 18.  It disagrees, however, with our 
conclusion that sequela is a singular noun, and argues that 
sequela means “all claims arising out of the injury.”2  
Appellee’s Br. 18.  This interpretation of sequela finds no 
support in law.  We find it unconvincing and reject it.   
 Second, we address the plain meaning of the second 
sentence of paragraph nineteen.  That sentence provides as 
follows: 
In exchange for Employer paying Employee the 
one-time lump sum payment as noted in 
paragraph number 10 of the herein Compromise 
and Release Agreement, Employee is forever 
relinquishing any and all rights to seek any and 
all past, present and/or future benefits, 
including, but not limited to, wage loss 
                                              
2 At oral argument, Boscov’s counsel went so far as to argue 
that the C&R’s language is broad enough to preclude all claims 
that touch upon the injury, even those that do not relate to 
workers’ compensation, and were unknown at the time the 
parties signed the C&R.    
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benefits, specific loss benefits, disfiguement 
[sic] benefits, medical benefits or any other 
monies of any kind including, but not limited 
to, interest, costs, attorney’s fees and/or 
penalties for or in connection with the alleged 
8/12/2015 [sic] work injury claim as well as any 
other work injury claim(s) Employee may have 
with or against Employer up through and 
including 4/7/2015. 
App. 31, ¶ 19 (emphasis added). 
 The clauses bolded in the block quotation above define 
“benefits” and “monies of any kind.”  The phrase “in 
connection with the alleged 8/12/2015 [sic] work injury claim 
as well as any other work injury claim(s)” limits those 
“benefits” and “monies” to “work injury claims.”  As a result, 
we read the C&R as only preventing Zuber from seeking 
benefits and monies from a work injury claim.  Here, Zuber 
seeks benefits and monies from FMLA and common law 
claims.  As a result, the C&R does not cover his claims.3 
C. The Structure of the C&R 
 The entire structure of the C&R also suggests that the 
parties did not intend the C&R to cover FMLA or common law 
                                              
3 An alternative reading would have to assume that “for or in 
connection with the alleged 8/12/2015 [sic] work injury claim” 
only modified “penalties” because it appears immediately 
before the final clause.  The C&R does not treat benefits, 
monies, and penalties differently in any other place.  As a 
result, we do not adopt this alternative reading. 
10 
 
claims.  Paragraph sixteen, which details the C&R’s purpose, 
and the employee certification support this conclusion. 
Paragraph sixteen defines the C&R’s purpose as follows: 
 The issues involved in this claim is [sic] 
the nature and extent of the alleged work 
injuries, disability and need for medical 
treatment as well as the overall compensability 
of the claim.  The parties are entering into the 
herein Compromise and Release Agreement to 
amicably resolve these issues and to avoid the 
costs and risks associated with any litigated 
matter. 
App. 31, ¶ 16 (emphasis added).  In light of this language, we 
read the C&R’s purpose as resolving the “work injuries, 
disability and need for medical treatment.”  Id.  As a result, we 
find that neither party intended to release claims that emanate 
from a lack of notice, a failure to properly designate leave, and 
acts of retaliation, such as Zuber’s FMLA and common law 
claims. 
 The employee certification reinforces this 
interpretation.  In that section of the C&R, Zuber confirmed 
that “[u]nless specifically stated in [the C&R], [he] 
understand[s] that [the C&R] is a compromise and release of a 
workers’ compensation claim . . . .”  App. 32, ¶ 5.  The 
employee certification thus bolsters the holding that the C&R 
only covers workers’ compensation claims.  As a result, Zuber 
would not have read paragraph nineteen’s language to cover 
non-workers’ compensation claims. 
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 Because of the C&R’s ordinary meaning and structure, 
we hold that the C&R is unambiguously a specific and limited 
release rather than a general release.  When Zuber signed the 
C&R, he merely released his right to bring a future workers’ 
compensation claim against Boscov’s.  Consequently, it does 
not prohibit Zuber from bringing FMLA or Pennsylvania 
common law claims against Boscov’s. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s orders granting Boscov’s Motion to Dismiss and 
denying Zuber’s Motion for Reconsideration.  We will remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
